An analysis of the language we use in scientific practice is critical to developing more rigorous and sound methodologies. This article argues that how certain methods of description are commonly employed in cognitive science risks obscuring important features of an agent’s cognition. We propose to make explicit a method of description wherein the concept of cognitive distinctions is the core principle. A model of referential communication is developed and analysed as a platform to compare methods of description. We demonstrate that cognitive distinctions, realised in a graph-theoretic formalism, better describe the behaviour and perspective of a simple model agent than other less systematic or natural language dependent methods. We then consider how different descriptions relate to one another in the broader methodological framework of minimally cognitive behaviour. Finally, we explore the consequences of, and challenges for, cognitive distinctions as a useful concept and method in the scientific toolkit of cognitive scientists.

PDF/TeX | DOI

Gaul, T. M., Izquierdo, E. J. (2025). Cognitive distinctions as a language for cognitive science: comparing methods of description in a model of referential communication. Artificial Life, 31(3), 345-467. MIT Press.

@article{Gaul.Izquierdo2025,
  author = {Gaul, Thomas M and Izquierdo, Eduardo J},
  year = {2025},
  title = {Cognitive distinctions as a language for cognitive science},
  subtitle = {comparing methods of description in a model of referential communication},
  journal = {Artificial Life},
  volume = {31},
  number = {3},
  pages = {345--367},
  publisher = {MIT Press},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.1162/artl_a_00475}
}

Commentary

The linked PDF is a preprint — I have never seen the published version. If you have, please email me a PDF.